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In terms of generating discussion, few articles in the philosophy of physics
can parallel Earman and Norton’s (1987) article on the “hole argument” in
the General Theory of Relativity. In short, by the 1970s, spacetime substan-
tivalism had come into vogue, but Earman and Norton argued that a sub-
stantivalist must be committed to a pernicious form of indeterminism. Their
argument seems to cleverly exploit the diffeomorphism freedom of GTR, a
mathematical subtlety that had tripped up even Einstein himself.
Here we attempt to answer the following question: what is the mathe-
matical fact or facts on which the hole argument is supposed to be based?
We identify two mathematical claims that might be relevant. The first of
these mathematical claims is trivially true — as pointed out by Weatherall
(2018) — and so does not underwrite any metaphysically interesting con-
clusions. While we agree with Weatherall’s point, we suggest that others
may have confused the trivial mathematical fact he identifies with another
mathematical claim, which, if true, would have profound consequences for
the interpretation of GTR. We prove here that this second mathematical
claim is false, and we conclude that there is no basis for the hole argument.
1 Uninteresting facts
We begin by restating the trivial mathematical fact that might mistakenly be
taken to generate the hole problem. In what follows, if M is a structured set
(i.e. an object in a concrete category) then we let |M | denote its underlying
set.
Uninteresting Fact 1. Let M be a structured set, and let f : |M | → |M | be
any bijection such that f is not an automorphism of M . Then one can pull
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back the structure of M along f to define a distinct structured set N , such
that |M | = |N | and f : N →M is an isomorphism.
As Weatherall (2018) convincingly argued, Fact 1 is uninteresting from
the point of view of physics and metaphysics. We will just add a little bit of
our own gloss to his points.
The elements of |M | are mathematical objects, and our freedom to per-
mute them is the freedom of the mathematician. The elements of |M | can
be used to represent things in the physical world, but in that case, a per-
mutation f : |M | → |M | has no prima facie significance beyond a change of
notation.
More importantly, the existence of the isomorphism f : N →M supplies
no interesting information about the structure of the category of models
of the relevant physical theory. By “interesting information” we mean, for
example, information about whether the theory’s models have non-trivial
automorphisms, i.e. bijections that preserve the relevant structure. In par-
ticular, the existence of an isomorphism f : N → M does not show that M
itself has any non-trivial automorphisms.
There is a second mathematical fact that is only slightly less trivial than
the first. For this second fact, the notion of a permutation of the under-
lying set is replaced with the notion of a diffeomorphism of the underlying
manifold.
Uninteresting Fact 2. Let M be a smooth manifold, and let g be a met-
ric on M . Given a proper open subset O of M , there is a diffeomorphism
ϕ : M →M that is non-trivial inside O, but trivial outside of O. Hence, ϕ
is an isometry from (M,φ∗g) to (M, g), where ϕ∗ is the pullback of covariant
tensors.
The commonly used notation (M, g) is the source of much confusion, for
it tempts one to think of ϕ as a non-trivial isometry from M to itself. But
M is a bare manifold, not a manifold with metric, and so it does not make
sense to talk about isometries of M . Instead, we should be clear that the
domain and range of the isometry ϕ are distinct objects in the category of
Lorentzian manifolds. Moreover, there is no more reason to think of this
isometry ϕ as non-trivial than there was to think of the isomorphism f :
N → M from Fact 1 as non-trivial. In particular, the existence of the
isometry ϕ : (M,φ∗g) → (M, g) does not imply that (M, g) has any non-
trivial automorphisms. For example, if (M, g) is a rigid spacetime (i.e. one
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that has no non-trivial isometries) then (M,ϕ∗g) is also a rigid spacetime, and
the map ϕ is no more physically interesting than the identity automorphism
of (M, g).
2 Interesting non-facts
It is a trivial fact that the same mathematical object can be represented in
different ways, say as (M, g) and as (M,φ∗g). So how could that fact generate
so much philosophical discussion? We suggest that the trivial mathematical
fact was confused for the following:
Interesting Claim. There is a relativistic spacetime M , a proper open sub-
set O of M , and an isometry f : M → M that acts non-trivially inside O,
but trivially outside O.
If this claim were true, it would have profound consequences for our un-
derstanding of GTR. It would indeed entail that everything that happens
outside, and in particular in the past, of O is not sufficient to determine
what happens inside O. If such were true, we would be forced to admit that
GTR is indeterministic in one very precise sense. Before proving that this
claim is false, we should pause to clarify the sense in which the existence of
this kind of “hole isometry” would imply indeterminism.
Intuitively, if things in O can be moved around without moving anything
in the past of O, then there are two distinct spacetimes M and M ′ that agree
on an initial segment. The existence of such spacetimes would show that
GTR violates the Montague-Lewis-Earman (MLE) criterion for deterministic
theories (see Montague, 1974; Lewis, 1983; Earman, 1986): if possible worlds
W and W ′ agree on some initial segment, then W = W ′.
There is, however, a problem with the MLE definition, namely that it
relies on an imprecise account of the identity of worlds (or models, or space-
times). Indeed, consider again the problems we ran into with the Uninterest-
ing Facts from earlier in this paper. In that case there are two models M and
N that are isomorphic. So should we consider M and N to be the same or
different models? The MLE definition of determinism provides no guidance
on this issue, and so it is all too easy to arrive at contradictory verdicts.
We propose to make the MLE definition more precise by replacing the
ambiguous notion of sameness of worlds with the unambiguous notion of
equality of isomorphisms between models. The basic idea here should be:
3
if a theory is deterministic, then for any two models of that theory, if there
is an isomorphism between initial segments of those models, then that iso-
morphism extends uniquely to the entire models. Here we give a slightly
weaker condition which does not guarantee the existence of an extended iso-
morphism, but does guarantee uniqueness.
Definition. We say that theory T has Property R just in case for any two
models M and N of T , and initial segment U ⊆ M , if f : M → N and
g : M → N are isomorphisms such that f |U = g|U , then f = g.
We will not try to give a general definition of an “initial segment” of
a model, which presupposes that models are equipped with some kind of
dynamical structure. For globally hyperbolic spacetimes, the case of primary
interest here, an initial segment can be taken to be the causal past of some
Cauchy surface. In any case, the idea behind Property R (“rigidity”) is that
isomorphisms between M and N cannot agree in the past, but disagree in
the future.
We are now prepared to show that relativistic spacetimes have Property
R, and hence, that the “interesting claim” is false. That is, there is no
relativistic spacetime that permits a non-trivial hole isometry. We prove, in
fact, something much stronger: if two isometries agree on any open set, no
matter how small, then they agree everywhere.
Proposition. Let M and N be relativistic spacetimes. If f : M → N and
g : M → N are isometries such that f |U = g|U for some non-empty open
subset U ⊆M , then f = g.
Proof. Let M and N be relativistic spacetimes. Let f : M → N and g :
M → N be isometries such that f |U = g|U for some open subset U ⊆ M .
Consider an arbitrary vector ξa at any point p ∈ U . Let α : V → R be
any smooth map where V = f [U ] = g[U ]. Because f |U = g|U , we find that
(f∗(ξ
a))(α) = ξa(α ◦ f) = ξa(α ◦ g) = (g∗(ξa))(α) where f∗ and g∗ are push
forward maps at p (see Malament, 2012). Thus f∗(ξ
a) = g∗(ξ
a) for all vectors
ξa at p. Let {ξa1 , ..., ξa4} be an orthonormal tetrad at the point p. It follows
that {f∗(ξa1), ..., f∗(ξa4)} = {g∗(ξa1), ..., g∗(ξa4)} is an orthonormal tetrad at the
point f(p) = g(p). From Geroch (1969) we have: If M and N are relativistic
spacetimes and {ξa1 , ..., ξa4} and {ηa1 , ..., ηa4} are orthonormal tetrads at points
p ∈M and q ∈ N respectively, then there is at most one isometry ϕ : M → N
such that ϕ(p) = q and {ϕ∗(ξa1), . . . , ϕ∗(ξa4)} = {ηa1 , ..., ηa4}. So there is
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at most one isometry ϕ : M → N such that ϕ(p) = f(p) = g(p) and
{ϕ∗(ξa1), ..., ϕ∗(ξa4)} = {f∗(ξa1), . . . , f∗(ξa4)} = {g∗(ξa1), ..., g∗(ξa4)}. Since f and
g are both isometries of this kind, we know f = g.
From the previous result, we immediately obtain the following by taking
M = N and g = 1M .
Corollary. Let M be a relativistic spacetime. If f : M →M is an automor-
phism that is the identity on some non-empty open subset U ⊆M , then f is
the identity automorphism.
In particular, there is no way to isometrically move the contents of a
proper open subset O of M without moving something in the causal past
of O.
Crucially, our argument depends on the assumption that the relevant no-
tion of isomorphism between spacetimes is isometry. While we could imag-
ine some applications where other notions of sameness might be relevant, we
cannot imagine a case where diffeomorphism would be the relevant notion.
Diffeomorphisms of spacetimes preserve only their smoothness structure, and
can completely alter the most fundamental physical features of a spacetime,
including its causal structure. For example, Minkowski spacetime — which
is the causally best behaved spacetime imaginable — is diffeomorphic to a
spacetime with a singularity. Thus, if one claims that diffeomorphism is a
relevant notion of sameness, then one does not believe that singularities are
physically real features of spacetimes.
3 Trivial semantic indeterminism
In this section, we give an example of two simple theories that illustrate the
difference between genuine indeterminism and “trivial semantic indetermin-
ism.” By the latter we mean that any theory can count as indeterministic
insofar as we can change our minds about how to use words. For convenience,
our examples are formulated in many-sorted logic (see Halvorson, 2019).
Let Σ1 = {σ1, σ2, γ}, where σ1 and σ2 are sort symbols, and γ is a function
symbol of sort σ1 → σ2. Let T1 be the theory in signature Σ1 that says that
γ is a bijection. The intended interpretation of T1 is that σ1 is the sort of
spatial points at one (earlier) time, σ2 is the sort of spatial points at another
(later) time, and γ : σ1 → σ2 takes a point at the first time to the unique
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point at the later time to which it is connected by a “geodesic”. Thus, T1
resembles GTR in that their models have determinate dynamic structure.
In the case of GTR, for each spacetime M , and for each p ∈ M , there is a
unique vector v in the tangent space over p that specifies the four-momentum
of a particle at p.
We claim that the theory T1 is genuinely deterministic, and only trivially
semantically indeterministic. First to establish that T1 is deterministic, we
show that its models satisfy Property R. Suppose, for example, that M and
N are models of T , and that f, g : M → N are isomorphisms such that









and therefore f = g.
Despite being deterministic in an obvious sense, there is another sense —
a trivial semantic sense — in which T1 is indeterministic: the choice of domain
setsM(σ1) andM(σ2) does not constrain the choice of the isomorphismM(γ)
that connects the two of them. Indeed, changing this isomorphism generates
a “problem” for T1 that is identical in structure to the hole problem of GTR.
For example, let M be the model of T1 with M(σ1) = {a, b}, M(σ2) = {a′, b′},
and where M(γ) is the function that takes a to a′ and b to b′. Let N be the
model of T1 that is just like M except that N(γ) is the function that takes
a to b′ and b to a′. Then the models M and N are isomorphic, as witnessed
by the isomorphism f : M → N such that fσ1 is the identity on {a, b}, and
fσ2 flips elements of {a′, b′}.
Obviously, in the case of T1, the indeterminism is trivial and semantic.
But on the question of determinism, there is no relevant difference between
T1 and GTR, and hence the indeterminism of GTR is trivial and semantic.
For our second example, let Σ2 = {σ1, σ2}, and let T2 be the theory in Σ2
that says that the two domains have the same cardinality. (This restriction
on cardinality is purely to avoid distractions about dissimilarity with the
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first example.) Unlike T1, this theory T2 is genuinely indeterministic in the
following sense: there are models M and N of T2, and isomorphisms f, g :
M → N such that fσ1 = gσ1 but f 6= g. Indeed, any bijection fσ1 : M(σ1)→
N(σ1) can be combined with any bijection fσ2 : M(σ2) → N(σ2) to give
an isomorphism f : M → N . This shows that models of T2 do not have
determinate dynamical structure that connects earlier states of affairs to
later states of affairs.
Interestingly, both of these toy theories, T1 and T2, are prima facie sub-
stantivalist, for they quantify over spacetime points. If there is indeterminism
in a spacetime theory, it does not come from a commitment to the existence
of spacetime points, but from a lack of commitment to objective dynami-
cal structure.
4 Metric essentialism
There are interesting parallels between our take on the hole problem and
Maudlin’s metric essentialism, according to which “spacetime points have
their spatio-temporal properties essentially” (see Maudlin, 1990). Indeed,
on a charitable reading, our insistence that the hole argument would need a
non-trivial isometry is already implicit in Maudlin’s claim that spacetime is
represented by a metric space.
Earman and Norton’s difficulty arises from asserting that the sub-
stantivalist must regard space-time as represented by the bare
topological manifold. (Maudlin, 1990, p 545)
The substantivalist’s natural response to the hole dilemma is to
insist that space-time is represented not by the bare manifold but
by the manifold plus metric, by the metric space. (Maudlin, 1990,
p 546)
Since Maudlin claims that spacetime is represented by a metric space, he
would appear to agree with us that the correct notion of isomorphism of
spacetimes is isometry. Nonetheless, Maudlin is mistaken to think that the
reason that metric properties are invariant under isomorphism is because
metric properties are essential properties of spacetime regions.
We will illustrate the issues with a simple example. Let Σ = {P} be a
signature for a first-order language, with P a unary predicate symbol, and let
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T be a first-order theory in signature Σ. According to the standard textbook
definition (Marker, 2006, p 9), an isomorphism between models M and N
of T is a bijection f : M → N such that f [PM ] = PN , where PM is the
extension of P in the model M . In other words, isomorphisms preserve the
extension of predicates and relations.
What is the motivation for this way of defining isomorphism? The basic
idea behind isomorphism is structural sameness, i.e. two isomorphic situ-
ations should display the same structural features, even if their material
contents are very different. For example, if two situations are isomorphic,
then there are exactly the same number of things in the extension of P in
the first situation as there are in the extension of P in the second situation.
What is not required of isomorphic situations is that the same individuals
appear in the two situations, or that those individuals have the same proper-
ties in the two situations. For example, the situation in which Alice is P and
Bob is not-P is isomorphic to the situation in which Alice is not-P and Bob is
P . In other words, the motivation for saying that isomorphism preserves the
extension of P has nothing to do with individuals having their P properties
essentially; it has to do with not caring which individuals instantiate P .
Things do get a little more confusing in the case of automorphisms, i.e.
isomorphisms whose domain and range are the same model. In particular,
an automorphism f : M → M does not change the extension of predicates
such as P , i.e. a ∈ PM iff f(a) ∈ PM . Nonetheless, we do not grant that this
feature of automorphisms means that predicates like P represent modally
rigid properties, i.e. properties that objects either necessarily have or neces-
sarily lack. (That claim would prove way too much, because theories surely
do make use of contingently possessed properties!) Indeed, an automorphism
is a special case of an isomorphism, and so the motivation for the require-
ment that an isomorphism maps PM to PN must be more general than the
motivation that an automorphism preserves PM . Moreover, the motivation
for the requirement that an isomorphism maps PM to PN cannot be that P
represents a modally rigid property, because models M and N need not have
any individuals in common.
The same idea applies to isomorphisms of relativistic spacetimes, which
are, after all, models of GTR. The reason why isomorphisms should be isome-
tries, i.e. preserve metric structure, is not because spacetime points bear their
metric properties and relations essentially. Rather, the reason is that the the-
ory does not care at all about the identity of the points that instantiate the
metric structure; it cares only about which metric structure is instantiated.
8
To summarize, Maudlin suggests that isometry is the right notion of
sameness between spacetimes, and on this issue, we agree. What’s more,
if isometry is the right notion of sameness of spacetimes, then the hole argu-
ment presupposes that there are non-trivial hole isometries. Since no such
isometries exist, there is no mathematical basis for the hole argument.
5 Conclusion
The hole argument is supposed to show that spacetime substantivalism im-
plies indeterminism. What’s more, the notion of indeterminism at play is
that of Montague, Lewis, and Earman: there are possible worlds that agree
on an initial segment but then later diverge. Unfortunately, what it means
to say that possible worlds are the same, or that they agree on an initial
segment, is left vague and undefined.
Fortunately, philosophers of physics do not have to depend on their own
ingenuity to explicate the notion of identity of possible worlds. Instead, they
can use the same tools that physicists use when they reason about spaces of
models of a theory, or spaces of solutions to differential equations — tools
such as topology and category theory. That is, a theory, such as GTR, is not
specified by some vague collection of possible worlds, but by a collection of
models equipped with some well-defined mathematical structure.
In particular, a reasonable regimentation of GTR will treat spacetimes
as isomorphic only if they are isometric. And in that case, GTR is provably
deterministic, whether or not one thinks that spacetime is a substance.
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